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J.A. Jones Const. Co. v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc., 89 P.3d 1009
(Nev. 2004)1
COMMERCIAL LAW – BREACH OF CONTRACT, FRAUD IN
THE INDUCEMENT, CARDINAL CHANGE/
ABANDONMENT/QUANTUM MERUIT
Summary
Appeal from a judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict in an action concerning a
construction contract.
Disposition/Outcome
Affirmed, with respect to the district court’s judgment dismissing Appellant’s fraud-inthe-inducement claim. Reversed, with respect to the remainder of the district court’s judgment.
Remanded to the district court for a new trial.
Factual and Procedural History
Las Vegas Sands, Inc., awarded respondent Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc. (LMB) a
construction management contract for the Sands Exposition Center expansion project. After
negotiations, LMB awarded the project’s structural concrete portion to appellant J.A. Jones
Construction Company (Jones). Jones’s original bid for the concrete work was approximately
$8.4 million. In order to reduce the bid amount, LMB agreed to perform various preparatory
tasks and to streamline other tasks to shorten the time needed for Jones to complete its concrete
construction, thus reducing Jones’ overall costs. Both parties ultimately agreed that Jones would
perform the concrete work for $7.4 million.
The parties’ contract provides that the first phase of Jones’s work (Phase I) would begin
on July 1, 1997, and had to be completed by October 7, 1997. When Jones arrived on site on
July 1, however, none of the preliminary groundwork had been completed. Because the
excavation work was still in progress, Jones’s crews were unable to do much work during the
first two weeks of their contract. On July 3, Jones was told for the first time that major
underground utilities were being planned throughout the Phase I area. At about the same time,
Jones also learned of a change to the emergency egress plans. The new plans rendered at least a
portion of the unexcavated area in Phase I inaccessible to any work by Jones or the excavator for
a period of time. Due to these and various other complications, Jones did not complete Phase I
until June 1998, eight months after the original completion date. Pursuant to various requests for
change orders, LMB paid Jones an additional $1,078,303 for some of the changed-work
expenses incurred during those eight months; however, outstanding requests remained.
After negotiations proved unsuccessful, Jones ultimately filed a complaint against LMB
and National Fire Insurance Company of Hartford, holder of a surety bond related to the project.
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In its amended complaint, Jones alleged claims for breach of contract, fraud in the inducement,
cardinal change/abandonment/quantum meruit, and for enforcement of a mechanic's lien bond.
On each of its first three claims, Jones sought more than $5 million in damages.
At trial, Jones introduced evidence that some of its Phase I work was changed or
modified as a result of several instructions from LMB. Its major complaint, however, stemmed
from the obstructions, hindrances, and inefficiencies that rendered its work more difficult and
costly as a result of these changes and other major problems. As its defense, LMB relied upon
the “no damages for delay” clause contained in its contract with Jones, whereby Jones agreed not
to make any claims for damages on account of any delay, obstruction or hindrance. In response,
Jones proposed jury instructions listing the following exceptions to the “no damages for day”
provision of the contract: (1) willful concealment of foreseeable circumstances that impact
timely performance; (2) delays not contemplated by the parties at the time they entered into the
contract; (3) delays so unreasonable in length as to amount to an abandonment of the project; (4)
delays caused by bad faith or fraud of the other party; and (5) delays caused by active
interference on the part of the other party.
The district court, however, noted that Nevada has not adopted these exceptions and
declined to give the proposed jury instruction. Additionally, during trial, the district court
ordered Jones to elect between its contract-based and quantum meruit remedies and ultimately
dismissed Jones’ fraud-in-the-inducement claim. The district court also dismissed Jones’s
cardinal-change/ abandonment/quantum meruit claim. At the trial's conclusion, the jury awarded
Jones $1,152,912, using a general verdict form.
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court, held that (1) Jones was entitled to an instruction
on exceptions to the “no damages for delay" provision; (2) Jones was not required to elect
between suing on contract or in quantum meruit; (3) Jones did not present sufficient evidence of
fraud in the inducement; (4) Jones presented sufficient evidence of contract abandonment; and
(5) Jones presented sufficient evidence of cardinal change.
Discussion
1. Instruction on Exceptions to No-Damages-for-Delay Provision
According to the Nevada Supreme Court, a party has the right to have the jury instructed
on all theories of the party’s case that are supported by the evidence if the instructions are correct
statements of the law. The court found that although the contract’s “no damages for delay”
provision was valid and enforceable, the district court should have given an instruction regarding
the exceptions to this provision, with certain modifications.
The court noted that most of the exceptions in Jones's proposed instruction aid in
enforcing the “implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that exists in every Nevada
contract and essentially forbids arbitrary, unfair acts by one party that disadvantage the other.”2
Four of the five proposed exceptions relate directly to and are logical extensions of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing: (1) willful concealment of foreseeable circumstances
that impact timely performance, (2) delays so unreasonable in length as to amount to project
abandonment, (3) delays caused by the other party's bad faith or fraud, and (4) delays caused by
the other party's active interference. These exceptions give rise to a violation of the duty of good
2

Frantz v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 455, 465 n. 4, 999 P.2d 351, 358 n. 4 (Nev. 2000).

2

faith and fair dealing and are therefore a logical extension of existing law.3 Additionally, they
have been adopted by a majority of jurisdictions.
Accordingly, the court held that an instruction including these four exceptions should
have been given, with one modification. The exception for “willful concealment of foreseeable
circumstances that impact timely performance,” should be blended with the exception for
“delays caused by the other party’s bad faith or fraud” to create a more general exception: delays
caused by fraud, misrepresentation, concealment or other bad faith.
As to Jones’s final proposed exception for “delays not contemplated by the parties at the
time they entered into the contract,” the court noted that this exception has been adopted by some
courts and rejected by others. The court found that rejecting this exception is the better reasoned
approach. Knowing that unforeseen delays can occur, parties can bargain accordingly. A
subcontractor can protect itself from the risk of unforeseen delay simply by adjusting its bid
price in recognition of the potential additional costs or by refusing to accept a “no damages for
delays” provision in the contract.
In sum, the court concluded that the district court's instruction should have included the
following three exceptions: (1) delays so unreasonable in length as to amount to project
abandonment; (2) delays cased by the other party's fraud, misrepresentation, concealment or
other bad faith; and (3) delays caused by the other party's active interference.
2. Election of Claims/Remedies4
Next, the court found that Jones should not have been forced to choose between suing on
the contract and in quantum meruit. Although a party may not assert contradictory theories of
recovery such that the assertion of one theory will necessarily repudiate the other, the doctrine of
election of remedies applies only to inconsistent remedies.5 The court noted that such
contradiction or inconsistency did not exist in this case.
According to the court, an action may be based upon quantum meruit even though an
express contract exists.6 The contractor may base his action upon both the contract and upon a
quantum meruit by setting up the former in one count, and the latter in another in his complaint.
That a contract may have been changed or abandoned does not negate the assertion that at some
point there existed a breachable contract. Therefore, a party is not required to elect between
suing on the contract or in quantum meruit before obtaining a jury verdict. However, the district
court can determine, after trial, if a duplicate recovery has been obtained on the two theories of
recovery.7
Furthermore, causes of action for fraud in the inducement and breach of contract may be
pursued as distinct claims with separate and consistent remedies. It is the law that one who has
been fraudulently induced into a contract may elect to stand by that contract and sue for damages
for the fraud. When this happens and the defrauding party also refuses to perform the contract as
3

United States v. Metric Constructors, 325 S.C. 129, 480 S.E.2d 447 (1997).
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it stands, he commits a second wrong, and a separate and distinct cause of action arises for the
breach of contract.8
Thus, a plaintiff may assert several claims for relief and be awarded damages on different
theories. However, a plaintiff is not permitted to recover more than his or her total loss plus any
punitive damages assessed.
3. Fraud in the Inducement9
To establish fraud in the inducement, a party must prove by clear and convincing
evidence each of the following elements: (1) a false representation made by the defendant; (2)
the defendant’s knowledge or belief that the representation was false (or knowledge that it had an
insufficient basis for making the representation); (3) the defendant’s intention to therewith
induce the plaintiff to consent to the contract's formation; (4) the plaintiff’s justifiable reliance
upon the misrepresentation; and (5) damage to the plaintiff resulting from such reliance.10 Fraud
is never presumed; it must be clearly and satisfactorily proved.11
Jones primarily based its fraud-in-the-inducement claim on the following: (1) preparation
for underground utilities began shortly after the contract was signed, despite LMB's assurances
that no underground utilities would be installed; (2) LMB knew that some areas of caliche had
required blasting, but nevertheless promised Jones that its footings could be poured directly
against bearable caliche; and (3) LMB knew that some kind of revision to an egress would be
necessary. According to Jones, these facts showed that LMB's representations at the time of
contract negotiations and signing must have been false and that LMB intended to deceitfully
induce Jones into signing a contract that LMB knew could not have been carried out as planned.
The court, however, found that no evidence introduced at trial clearly and convincingly
demonstrated that LMB intended to deceive Jones into signing the contract based on information
it knew at the time was either false or lacked a sufficient basis as related to Jones's specific work
plans in the Phase I area. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Jones’s fraudin-the-inducement claim.
4. Cardinal Change/Abandonment/Quantum Meruit12
Jones presented its cardinal-change and abandonment theories as one claim, arguing that
contract abandonment and cardinal change were essentially the same and could lead to recovery
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in quantum meruit. The court found that Jones introduced evidence sufficient to submit both
theories to the jury.13
a. Contract abandonment
Different theories exist by which contractors have recovered the reasonable value of
performed work not contemplated by the terms of a contract. The contract-abandonment theory
has been used in some cases to permit recovery outside the contract when the work contracted
for is altered beyond the contract's scope.14 The original contract is held to exist as far as it can
be traced to have been followed, and the excess must be paid for according to its reasonable
value. However, where the alterations and changes are so great that it is impossible to follow the
original contract, the contract will be deemed to have been wholly abandoned, so that the
contractor can recover upon a quantum meruit.15
Generally, contract abandonment occurs when both parties depart from the terms of the
contract by mutual consent. This consent may be express, or it may be implied by the parties’
actions, such as when the acts of one party inconsistent with the contract’s existence are
acquiesced in by the other.16 Contract abandonment has been recognized where there have been
so many substantial changes to the contract that it can no longer be used to determine the value
of the work done.17 The issue of whether contract abandonment has occurred generally presents
a question of fact.18
At trial, Jones introduced evidence from which a jury could conclude that by directing
Jones to perform its work at an inadequately prepared and maintained site, LMB in effect
directed Jones to perform work inconsistent with provisions in the parties' contract which
specifically described the efficient manner and time frame in which Jones was to perform its
work. Thus, the court found that Jones’s claim of contract abandonment was improperly
dismissed.
b. Cardinal Change
The cardinal-change doctrine serves to provide a breach remedy for contractors who are
directed to perform work which is not within the general scope of the contract and which is
therefore not redressable under the contract.19 Thus, a cardinal change occurs when the work is
so drastically altered that the contractor effectively performs duties that are materially different
from those for which the contractor originally bargained.20 The contractor must prove facts with
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Although Jones did not assert on appeal that a separate claim for quantum meruit would be appropriate, the court
noted that both the contract-abandonment and cardinal-change theories may result in a damages award based on
quantum meruit.
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See, e.g., C. Norman Peterson Co. v. Container Corp., 172 Cal.App.3d 628, 218 Cal.Rptr. 592, 598 (Ct. App.
1985).
15
Paterson, 55 Nev. at 141, 28 P.2d at 500 (quoting Hood v. Smiley, 5 Wyo. 70, 36 P. 856, 857 (1894)).
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See id. at 141-42, 28 P.2d at 500.
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Rudd v. Anderson, 153 Ind.App. 11, 285 N.E.2d 836, 840 (1972).
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See, e.g., Harris v. IES Associates, Inc., 69 P.3d 297, 305 (Utah Ct.App. 2003).
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PCL Const. Services, Inc. v. U.S., 47 Fed. Cl. 745, 804 (2000).
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specificity that support its allegations that a cardinal change occurred.21 Although the cardinalchange doctrine has been predominantly discussed in disputes based on government contracts, its
underlying premise—that compensation for costs resulting from an abuse of authority under the
changes clause should not be limited by the terms of that clause—applies to private contracts that
include changes clauses.22 Thus, this cause of action is viable in the context of private
construction contracts.
Whether a change is cardinal is principally a question of fact, requiring that each case be
analyzed individually in light of the totality of the circumstances.23 Thus, a determination of the
scope and nature of alleged changes requires a fact-intensive inquiry into the events that led to
the excess work and their effect on the parties. The court must investigate the contract as a
whole to determine whether the owner or construction manager is responsible for the
contractor’s difficulties.24
While there is no precise calculus for determining whether a cardinal change has
occurred, the courts have considered the following factors: (1) whether there is a significant
change in the magnitude of work to be performed; (2) whether the change is designed to procure
a totally different item or drastically alter the quality, character, nature or type of work
contemplated by the original contract; and (3) whether the cost of the work ordered greatly
exceeds the original contract cost.25
In this case, the court noted that the issue is whether the entirety of the changes and
impacts on Jones’s work was so extensive as to force Jones to perform work beyond the confines
of the contract. Because the evidence required to demonstrate the occurrence of cardinal change
is similar to that required by the contract-abandonment theory, the court found that Jones could
also be entitled to relief on its claim under a theory of cardinal change. Consequently, the court
held that the district court erred in dismissing this claim.
Conclusion
This case establishes that “no damages for delays” provisions of construction contracts
are not enforceable for (1) delays so unreasonable in length as to amount to project
abandonment; (2) delays caused by the other party’s fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, or
other bad faith; or (3) delays caused by the other party’s active interference. This case also
recognizes the cardinal-change doctrine" as a breach remedy for contractors who are directed to
perform work which is not within the general scope of the contract, and which is therefore not
redressable under the contract.
21

PCL, 47 Fed. Cl. at 804.
See, e.g., Hensel Phelps Const. v. King County, 57 Wash.App. 170, 787 P.2d 58 (1990) (concluding that a
subcontractor whose contract incorporated terms of a government contract had not demonstrated the occurrence of a
cardinal change when the shape and size of an area to be painted remained the same and its only claims were for
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Becho, Inc. v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 595 (2000); see also Rumsfeld, 329 F.3d at 1332.
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